Abstract

1. In February this year the New Zealand Government made an ambitious - and hotly contested - foray into the arena of social and family responsibilities. 1.4 million copies of the public discussion document Towards a Code of Social and Family Responsibility were sent out - one to every householder in the country. The booklet drew vigorous public debate and more than 94,000 formal responses.
2. Mostly people wanted to know what the Government intended by such a Code and, in particular, what it would mean in daily life. Some critics condemned it as a crude exercise in social engineering, others as wasteful and meaningless, still others as the cynical preparation of a constituency for further welfare reforms. Certainly, many believe the Code is code for something. On the other side, it also attracted much support - some saw it as a welcome return to basic family values, and many as a timely opportunity to put forward pragmatic solutions to deep-seated social ills.
3. The Government itself has articulated a desire to foster a debate on the appropriate balance between the responsibilities of the state for its citizens and the responsibilities of citizens for their own wellbeing and for that of their families. The Prime Minister has suggested that the proposed Code might act as a circuit breaker - to stop looking to social spending as the only solution to social problems.
4. This paper assesses the potential for such a Code to progress Government's social and family policy objectives. It begins by describing the political and the policy contexts in which the notion of a Code was born - and the key Cabinet decisions that followed. It then comments on the public discussion phase as a way of directly engaging the public in social policy debate, the challenges posed in analysing the tens of thousands of responses received, and the policy advice developed on the possible status, scope and content of a code. The last section reflects on the outcome of the code exercise. It comments in particular on the proposed code as a way to influence the behaviour of parents towards their children.

5. The proposal for a code of social responsibility first came into the public arena in the Treasurer’s budget statement in June 1997. He stated that the government was intending to develop a code of social responsibility for those receiving "significant support from the state". The code was to be "a form of contract" with a focus on individuals’ responsibilities to themselves and to their families. Example of such responsibilities were: to seek paid work, to be a good parent; and to manage money received from the state well. The responsibilities were framed in the statement as obligations: the obligation to be active in seeking work, to carry out good parenting practices, and to follow budget advice.
6. The announcement was not the product of any specific policy development process: its gestation was political. The background included:
   

   • the 1990 - 1993 National Government’s concern for welfare reform;
   • the 1993 - 1996 National Government‘s focus on the obligations of beneficiaries;
   • the NZ First interest in parental responsibilities and its leader’s concerns about the responsibilities of those receiving income support from the state
   • the process of developing the Coalition Government’s first budget.

7. The politicised nature of the code proposal was apparent from the start. The media response to the Treasurer’s announcement, picking up Opposition positions, was to label it beneficiary bashing. The Minister of Social Welfare, whose policy responsibility the code became, was left to defend the Government’s position. He did so, arguing that the code proposal was not just focused on beneficiaries and articulating a vision which was much wider: as a code which could be applied to all New Zealanders, which would be the foundation for policy development over all social portfolios, and which could become a basis for a coordinated approach to social policy.
8. While the concept of a code was a new one and not yet subject to much policy scrutiny, the social policy issues which a code might address were not: a concern about the degree of dependency on benefit amongst the working age population; and a concern about how well some families were carrying out their parenting responsibilities and the need to find better ways to support them.
9. The identification of benefit dependency as a problem went back to at least the 1991 social assistance reforms, in which the then Minister of Social Welfare, and now Prime Minister, the Hon Jenny Shipley, stated that New Zealand needed "to make bold changes and strike a new balance between the state’s responsibility for the citizen and the citizen’s responsibility for their lives and those of their families". The concern about parenting has been a consistent policy focus across health , education and welfare sectors since the mid 1990s. Both feature in the Strategic Result Areas promulgated by the Government early in 1997, and benefit reform and finding ways to encourage parents to meet their responsibility to their children were policy priorities of the new administration.
10. Work on taking forward the code proposal was not promoted by the Treasurer nor the Minister for Social Welfare immediately after the budget announcements, in part because some of the salient issues were being pursued through the policy work on benefit reform and parental responsibilities. Also, it would seem from subsequent comments that the then Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Jim Bolger, was not supportive. However, in October 1997 discussions took place between officials and the Minister of Social Welfare on the possible scope, content and status of a code, and on the advantages and disadvantages which might accompany its adoption.
11. When Jenny Shipley became Prime Minister in November 1997 the project gained much greater momentum. She announced that leading a debate on social responsibility would be one of the priorities of her administration. She directed officials that the first step would be to engage the public in a discussion of the issues, including the concept of a code and what status it might be given. She determined after discussion with key ministers that the proposed code was to cover individuals and families and not just those who were receiving significant income support from the state; there was, however, a focus on the obligations of parents to their children and of beneficiaries to become self reliant. She charged the Minister of Social Welfare with the task of developing a public discussion document and managing a public discussion phase. The Prime Minister was also very involved with other senior ministers in deciding the content, style and format of the document, and in the decision that it would be sent to all households. The timeframe was tight: the public discussion phase was to be launched in the Prime Minister’s speech at the opening of Parliament on 17 February, and the public discussion document was to go out by 23 February.
12. The Government made the key decisions in January at the first two Cabinet meetings under Jenny Shipley’s leadership. The decisions were:

    • that high priority be given to the development of a Code of Social and Family Responsibility (hereafter the Code) but that final decisions on whether to proceed would await the outcome of the public discussion phase and policy advice on what legal status a code might be given;
    • that the emphasis would be on individual and family responsibilities (implicit in this was that the Code would not just apply to beneficiaries) with a particular focus on parents’ responsibilities to their children and individual responsibilities for education and training, seeking work if on benefit, managing money well and keeping healthy;
    • that the public discussion document and a response form inviting written responses would be sent to all householders and boxholders in New Zealand, rather than a more targeted distribution to interested organisations with public access through libraries and freephone requests.

13. The Government also decided to set up a policy development process to run in parallel with the public discussion. This is covered later in this paper.
14. In summary, the proposal for a code, primarily for beneficiaries, had its genesis in NZ First policy ideas and found some support in the Coalition Government. It was broadened into a wider social policy initiative by the Minister of Social Welfare. Then the new Prime Minister, Jenny Shipley, was instrumental in casting it as a code of social and family responsibility, using it as an opportunity to stimulate a debate about the balance of responsibility between state and families/individuals, and shaping the public discussion by distributing a booklet to all households and inviting a response.

15. The Government’s primary objective in launching the public discussion phase, as outlined in a January 1998 Cabinet paper, was to stimulate discussion on individual and family responsibilities, the merits of a code, and the set of responsibilities which it might contain. A secondary objective was to seek written responses on the issues in the discussion document.

16. The public discussion document, Towards a Code of Social and Family Responsibility, was distributed to 1.4 million householders and boxholders in late February 1998, together with a response form, inviting written responses. Copies of the public discussion document were also made available in five other languages, on the internet, on audio tape and on a video in NZ Sign Language. Supplementary fact sheets on each issue and other information was made available through a freephone call centre. Just over two months was allowed for responses to be received.

17. The stated aim of the public discussion document was to "set out the facts on a number of very important social and family issues" and to spell out "what might become an agreed set of expectations". It also invited people to give their views "to help shape the final form the Code might take" and announced that "once the expectations have been finalised they may become Government policy and/or be spelt out in laws". Seven of the eleven issues were primarily concerned with parenting responsibilities - for example ‘Keeping Children Healthy’ and ‘Sharing Parenthood.’ Others such as ‘Managing Money’ and ‘Training and Learning for Employment’ focused more on individual responsibilities - and, in particular, those of beneficiaries. Under each issue a proposed expectation was set out; for example, the expectation under Managing Money read "People will manage their money to meet the basic needs of themselves and their family". A full list of the eleven issues and expectations is attached in Appendix 1.
18. Under each issue there was a brief description of current law and of the role of Government in that area, as well as a number of questions for discussion and feedback. The Government also wanted to use the exercise to test public reaction to some possible new policy ideas - mostly affecting beneficiaries - which were bound to be controversial; for example one question asked whether beneficiary parents should be required to ensure their children attended school as a condition of benefit. Another asked whether people who repeatedly seek emergency income support should be made to go to budget advice, or have their benefit assigned to a money manager.

19. The public discussion phase generated a huge amount of media coverage and political commentary. It is safe to say that the objective of stimulating widespread discussion and debate was easily met. Some commentators asserted that the debate was worth having; that the process was democratic in its comprehensiveness; or that it was about time the taxpayers insisted on their rights to ask what beneficiaries did in return for the money they received. Others voiced a range of concerns: that the questions were too specialised/too simplistic; that it would be extremely hard to analyse; that complex government policy decisions should not be determined by questionnaires; that the Government was trying to absolve itself of its own responsibilities to support families at risk; or that the subtext of the document was to paint beneficiaries as ‘deviants’ while at the same time suggesting that they be required to meet higher social and moral standards than anyone else.
20. Certainly the Government’s decision to send the discussion document to all householders had far-reaching implications, both in terms of how the exercise was perceived publicly and in terms of the options available for analysing responses (the analysis issue is dealt with in paras 22-23 below). One problem was that the dissemination of the document to every householder gave it the appearance of a nationwide survey or referendum, but it had none of the controls necessary for the data collected to be treated as representative of the population as a whole. Critics were quick to comment that at around NZ$1.5 million the exercise was far more costly than a sample-based research survey but yet that the data gathered would have absolutely no statistical validity. Some feared that the Government might try to use the responses to the document in a selective manner so as to justify implementing some of the tougher measures being floated.
21. The Government response was that this was never the aim of the exercise. Rather, the objectives were first and foremost to stimulate widespread discussion and debate, and secondly to enable people to have their say on important social issues. In this sense, the process was more like a submission process where an issue is publicly debated and canvassed through an issues document or report and a self-selected group of people elect to respond. The Hon Bill English, Minister of Health recently summed up the Government’s position:

    "I think the argument about methodology is a total red herring. The Hikoi of Hope was significant and Government gives weight to it, not because it’s a statistical sample of the New Zealand population but because it expressed some views pretty clearly, directly to Government, and we should listen. The same as happens here. … If we are going to say social policy can only be made when the social scientists are happy, then we’re never going to get anywhere".

22. In all 94,303 written responses to the public discussion document were received, over 90% of which were on the response form provided. According to the self-reported demographic information provided, over 70% of responses came from individuals or households, within the 25-70 age range and of the New Zealand European ethnic group. All responses were read and analysed.

23. In retrospect, had there been more time to develop the discussion booklet with the analysis process in mind, and had officials anticipated that Government would opt for full-scale nationwide distribution, rather than the more usual targeted distribution to interested groups and individuals, the questions in the document and the response form would have probably been designed somewhat differently. In particular, the task of collating and analysing the 94,303 responses would have been rather more straightforward had the questions been limited to close-ended yes/no or multi-choice questions, so that all responses could be electronically scanned. As it was, the document contained a mix of open and close-ended questions, and to complicate matters further, some were compound questions requiring both yes/no and open-ended text responses. Of course, what would have been lost with a multi-choice-type questionnaire was the sheer breadth and richness of text responses - the opportunity for people to respond to the questions exactly how they wished and to put forward their own, relatively raw, unmoderated ideas and views.
24. So how was the analysis done? A small team of three people was recruited to manage the analysis and report on the findings. The analysis involved dealing with two types of data; tick box data and text data. The tick box data capture was quite straightforward - answers were electronically scanned into a data-base for analysis. For the written responses a two step process was used. A small number of content analysts first took a sample of the responses and recorded themes and sub-themes which emerged. The analysts kept looking at more response forms until the point at which no new themes were emerging. These themes formed the basis of a coding sheet. A larger team of 80 coders were then recruited and trained to code the individual responses against the coding sheet themes. In addition coders were asked to record in a supplementary book any comments, nuances or details in the responses which could not be adequately captured by the coding sheet themes. The results were then analysed and recorded in The Response Report. An independent critique of the response analysis methodology by a marketing expert concluded that the processes used were sound and that confidence could be had in the integrity of the resultant database.

25. Not surprisingly with this number of responses, what came across most strongly was the diversity of ideas and views. For instance, on the question of the status of the code, no clear picture emerged. There were, however, some prevalent themes and views. A majority of responses said they supported the eleven expectations, and a majority also wanted to see other expectations included, most commonly expectations of government. Overall, responses tended to favour roles for government in achieving the expectations and to favour educative and information-based approaches. However, many of the tougher measures being floated also received majority support; for instance, the proposals that beneficiary parents should be required to ensure their children attended school as a condition of benefit; and that people who repeatedly seek emergency income support should be made to go to budget advice.
26. The results of the responses as a whole were also tabulated against the demographic data to see whether there were any notable differences in the responses from different sub-populations. The results proved interesting. For instance, there was no notable difference in the results by gender, and few differences by age. The differences were most marked in the small percentage of responses (4%) reported as being from groups or organisations (as opposed to individuals (39%) or households (34%). For instance, the proportion of group respondents who specifically stated ‘no code’ was more than double that of the respondent population as a whole. By contrast, NZ Asian responses were more supportive of the expectations and a legal approach to a code than the respondent population as a whole. Group responses also tended to be a lot less supportive of any proposals involving tougher or more punitive measures and in many cases, the results reversed the trend of the total respondent population.
27. It would be risky to draw conclusions about what this may mean - particularly given the loose data collection method. Some have suggested that the widespread rejection of the code by groups who responded was a reflection of the more considered processes of meeting and discussion by people who were likely to be experienced at exactly the kind of analysis the questions called for. Another reading is that some groups are perhaps not as representative of wider constituencies as they claim to be.
28. What can be said is that the 94,303 responses to the public discussion document cannot be used as a guide to public opinion generally; nor can they be generally characterised as a collection of focused, reasoned submissions by key interest groups. The response analysis team noted that the huge amount of data generated from this process was "somewhat similar to the output from a brainstorming session", where "many of the ideas appear at first glance to be of limited merit". But it also concluded that there was real benefit in the fact that such ideas had not been "killed at birth", because variations on those same ideas might "provide a range of creative and innovative policy solutions to the seemingly intractable problems raised in the discussion document".

29. The processes which led to the announcement of Government’s intention to have a code, the subsequent debate about is scope and nature, the emphasis on a public discussion bought by the new Prime Minister in November, and the timetable which required a public discussion document a few weeks later, all meant that any detailed work on the merits or otherwise of a code was not done prior to the February launch of the public discussion phase. Instead it took place from April to September of this year, concurrently with the analysis of responses to the discussion document. The policy work focused on four areas:

• the status the Code might be given - in particular its legal status;
• the scope and content it might have - what areas of social responsibility and what behaviours;
• the implications for the Code of the Government’s obligations under human rights acts and conventions, and as a treaty partner under the Treaty of Waitangi;
• the outcome of the public discussion phase and whether a further public discussion was needed.

30. The work was done by an interdepartmental working group reporting through senior officials and the Ministers of Health, Education and Welfare to Cabinet.
31. The policy process was complicated by the absence of a developed proposal for a Code other than the set of expectations in the public discussion document. The expectations were the clearest expression of Government thinking, being described by the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister as "our first attempt at a possible Code of Social and Family Responsibility". A second difficulty was uncertainly about the likely behavioural impact of a Code, a problem exacerbated by the provisional nature of what was proposed. Policy analysts were operating in the realm of the hypothetical and untested. Attempts to find something similar in countries with legal, social and political institutions akin to those in New Zealand were unsuccessful. Anything similar to the set of expectations were either very specific and applied to beneficiaries as part of a contract e.g. in some state welfare jurisdictions in the USA, or were compilations of laws affecting parents and children, or were more akin to citizen’s charters i.e. the state’s responsibilities to its citizens rather than vice versa.
32. Officials looked at four options for the status the code might be given:

• put into law (this option was in the public discussion document and had been the subject of some comment by the Minister of Social Welfare);
• put into guidelines for officials in order to influence their exercise of discretion, e.g. in supplementary benefit decisions, or in interpreting legislation;
• incorporated into government policy statements - in what might be called an exhortatory approach to influencing behaviour;
• incorporated into information based approaches to influencing behaviour (including public education and promotion).

33. The approaches were looked at from the perspective of operational feasibility, risks to the Crown including challenges that human rights and Treaty obligations were not being met, and likely impact on the behaviour of individuals and families. The outcome of the analysis was as follows:

• putting the Code into law as set out in the expectations would not be feasible: the expectations were too indeterminate, and difficulties of interpretation would be too great. Even if the detail of the obligations were to be recast, the disadvantages from disruption to current law, the intrusive enforcement mechanisms which would be required, and the risk of successful challenges on human rights or Treaty grounds well outweighed the advantages which might come from changed behaviour;
• putting the Code into guidelines also had risks of disruption, arbitrary action, and the development of practices open to challenge under human rights and Treaty provisions; for example, proposals to regulate broadly defined behaviours through contact with government agencies would raise problems of the differential impact on certain groups who were high users of the services, such as Maori and women;
• the expectations in the Code could be incorporated into government policy statements;
• the expectations could also form the basis of advice about responsible behaviour and good parenting, in information based approaches to changing behaviour.

34. The advice to Ministers, therefore, was that the Code in the form set out in the public discussion document was not feasible as law, and that the potential benefits which might come from modifying to make it more suitable as legislation, were that possible, were too uncertain to make it a priority. Seeking to put the Code into guidelines for officials also carried risks which outweighed the advantages. A code, as a coherent set of obligations akin to those in the public discussion document and given formal status as law or guidelines, was too blunt an instrument and too risky a venture for the Crown, to have merit as a social policy initiative for further development.
35. These recommendations, of course, had a fundamental impact on any policy work on the scope and content a proposed code might have: in short, the problems in operationalising the concept of a code made further work on its scope and content redundant. Issues about content, such as those about specific ways in which government could encourage good parenting were, it was argued, best taken forward through specific policy and operational initiatives, with consideration being given within each specific proposal to the appropriate mix of regulatory, incentives-based and facilitative approaches which would support and encourage particular behaviours.
36. Officials also recommended against a further discussion round on the broad issues of social and family responsibility, on the grounds that the Government report-back on the outcome of the public discussion phase would be likely in itself to generate further public discussion and debate. Public consultation on certain specific initiatives coming out of the code process could also be considered.

37. How did the Government respond to the findings from the public responses and the policy advice it received from officials on the possible status of a code and how to take the initiative forward? Certainly, while this work was completed fairly much to plan by early September, any sense of political urgency around it had dissipated by this time. Undoubtedly, there were more pressing concerns for Government - like the Asian crisis, and the demise of the National-New Zealand First Coalition to be replaced by a National-led minority government. The crumbling of the coalition also meant that the code’s original protagonist, Winston Peters, was now an opposition MP. And it was clear from various public comments made by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Social Services, Work and Income, Roger Sowry, that neither were committed to the idea of formalising a code in legislation. There was no real surprise then in Mr Sowry’s official announcement in late October that "the Government believes a legislated code is neither required nor desirable" and that it prefers instead "to follow an educative and incentive-based approach to achieving positive social change". Further, the analysis of responses had produced "ten clear suggestions for initiatives which the Government [would] look at over the coming months".
38. Government had selected the ten initiatives, on the advice of officials, from a longer list of possible ideas for further development, all of which were drawn from responses to the public discussion document and related policy work. Together the ten initiatives comprised a mix of health, education, welfare and cross-sectoral initiatives, including four focusing on improving education or information provision in different areas; a housing research project; consideration of mandatory budget advice and/or money management for some beneficiaries; consideration of tougher measures for youth offenders; and greater support for various early intervention programmes for children and young people. A list of these ten initiatives is attached in Appendix 2. Officials are now working on a report back to Cabinet on development of these initiatives.

39. This discussion will focus on the proposed code as a way for government to influence behaviour of individuals and families; in particular the behaviour of parents towards their children as set out in the expectations.

40. It is not surprising that family responsibilities became a major focus in discussion on the code. The code proposal goes to the heart of the contested ground about the role of the state in families - its mandate, its purpose and its likely effectiveness. Policy for families is once again becoming a focus in social policy discourse in NZ as in the UK, the USA and Australia. Similar themes have emerged: concerns about changes in family structures, the impact of economic recession and restructuring, and the impact of family life on the health, education and well-being of children both as citizens now and as future adult consumers and workers.
41. One issue which has gained the attention of governments of various political complexions is the extent to which parents are able and willing to meet their responsibilities to their children. It can be seen in such varying places as: the concerns about child neglect and poverty in the USA; the policies for young offenders and parenting orders in Blair’s Britain (Crimes and Disorders Act 1998); the way child welfare services in the UK, the USA, Australia (and a case could be made for New Zealand) are focusing on child abuse and the management of risks from caregivers - usually parents. Child support has been a focus for governments in Australia, New Zealand, USA and Britain for the past 10 years. Now parent education as a way to achieve better parenting is becoming a common theme in government initiatives. Better parenting is, it would seem, a panacea for many social ills. It is part of the strengthening families policies in both Australia and New Zealand. The proposed code in New Zealand, as we have seen, had its origins in considerable part in a desire to address what were seen as problems of poor parenting.

42. There is of course a legitimate state interest in the care being given children, which arises out of the its obligation to protect those who are vulnerable to maltreatment (such as children), and its interest in the socialisation of children into responsible and productive adults. This interest leads the state to be concerned about what goes on within families, and with how parents are undertaking the tasks of care and socialisation. However, New Zealand has, along with other English speaking countries, generally adopted a perspective on policies for families which emphasises family autonomy. The care of children is primarily regarded as part of a ‘private’ domain outside of the public and economic spheres. Such an approach is consistent with much contemporary policy towards the family in countries like New Zealand, and with current child welfare practices. Social problems such as poor outcomes for children are located primarily within the family. Poor parenting is assumed to be one of the primary causes of poor outcomes, and poor parenting is associated with the personal strengths and weaknesses of the caregivers. The role of the state is primarily a residual one: to intervene when family responsibility fails.
43. These seemingly contradictory positions - an emphasis on autonomy and privacy at the same time as an interest in how children are faring - gives rise to what some writers have described as the liberal dilemma: how to ensure adequate socialisation of children and protect the vulnerable without intruding in areas seen as the private realm of the family. The notion of the family as part of the private domain also leads to viewing the state and the family as operating in quite separate spheres, in tension if not conflict, between which relatively simple trade-offs can be made. From this point of view, a greater acceptance of responsibilities by parents will reduce the degree to which the state has to intervene to ensure adequate care and socialisation of children, reinforcing family autonomy and reducing the burden on taxpayers.
44. These interpretations of contemporary family policy in countries like New Zealand, help to provide some insights into the code initiative and how it might be interpreted. The code initiative can be read as an attempt to strengthen the influence of the state over families by being clearer about how parents should behave in the private realm of the family, by establishing the desired behaviours as expectations, and (depending on the status to be given the code) to set some expectations down as obligations under law.
45. The code initiative also reinforced the simple model of family and state existing in separate spheres. While the role of community and state support for families was acknowledged in the public discussion document, the context of the public discussion tended towards the "state or family" model. It was articulated by the Prime Minister (one of the matters she wanted the public to consider was the balance between state and family responsibilities), and reinforced by the response of many that the Code was just another attempt by the state to shift responsibilities onto families.

46. It is clear, however, from the public discussion, the responses, and the policy work done, that the relationship between state and family is more complicated than the simple trade-off model would assume. Also, the prospect of a code gave added tension to the liberal dilemma rather than reducing or resolving it. First, the focus of the Code on individual and family responsibilities drew the not unexpected response: What about government’s social responsibility, in particular the role of government in ensuring that families had sufficient resources to carry out their social care tasks. As one response had it "If government wants us to pull up our socks, first it has to make sure we have socks". Increasing expectations on parents may have the unintended consequence of increasing pressure on government to improve support services rather than reduce the necessity for them.
47. Second, by addressing all families, the Code raised issues of the state’s mandate to intervene in areas which are generally regarded as the private sphere of the family. It can be argued that family autonomy is usually protected by practices of minimum necessary intervention in the child welfare system, and by socially distancing those families where intervention occurs from the rest of society, for example by labelling them as abusive, dysfunctional or high risk. The Code opened up the prospect of a wider monitoring of family life and, potentially, of subjecting a much larger group of families to state intervention. This aspect of the Code drew two responses: a general concern that it might lead to coercive measures which would infringe freedoms without justification; and a cynical interpretation that the universality was window dressing and that the Code was primarily designed to regulate and penalise those groups already marginalised - such as beneficiaries. There is some evidence that amongst respondents there was some acceptance of greater intervention where significant income support was being paid. But considerable problems arise in going further with generalised obligations: as already noted those problems include the potential for arbitrary and coercive measures and breaches of human rights obligations.
48. Third, the prospect of a code brought into sharp focus the problematic nature of just what good parenting might comprise. While general concepts such as meeting basic needs may gain some consensus, determining what behaviours constitute love and affection in a way which might fit a code of behaviour is much more difficult. Such behaviours are very much socially and culturally determined and their practice is often highly gendered. Not surprisingly, family law about the nature of care and socialisation is often set out in very general ways and left to be interpreted on a case by case basis after careful consideration. One of the policy concerns about the merits of the code was how behavioural obligations might be set out in ways which did not breach human rights and Treaty obligations. Even if cultural and other social differences were taken into account, there are all manner of ways in which parents and children care for each other and as Hartley Dean points out "it is more important to assist them than it is to prescribe for them".

49. The policy development process and public debate focused more on the disadvantages and risks of a code rather than the advantages which might accrue. In large part that is because it is very difficult to predict what the behavioural change might be as a result of putting a code into law or guidelines. Most parents already do a good enough job in meeting their parenting responsibilities. There is general public support for the sorts of behaviours set out in the public discussion document. For those parents who struggle to meet their children’s needs, there are often extenuating circumstances, and the social work literature does not provide much evidence that coercive measures are very effective. The evidence from history of attempts by the state to impose family responsibilities is not encouraging. David Thomson has written of the experiment in 19^th Century New Zealand which failed as soon as demographic and economic pressures put it to the test. Current attempts in the arena of social care suggest that social policy interventions cannot compel people to adopt particular patterns of responsibility when they are counter to demographic, economic and social pressures.

50. It is not surprising that the Code as envisaged as a set of behavioural expectations of government on individuals and families, in particular in respect of the responsibilities of parents to their children, is not being taken forward. A code of the sort proposed is too uncertain in its positive impact; not feasible as a basis for positive law; too risky of coercive measures in its implementation; and too likely to infringe human rights and Treaty obligations. As an instrument of state intervention the proposed code proved too blunt to meet the requirements of the liberal approach to family regulation in the New Zealand tradition: to intervene in families in ways which did not do too much violence to the concept of family autonomy.
51. But that is not to say that policy makers will not continue to seek ways to regulate families, and in particular to try to reinforce intra-family responsibilities. The pressures to do so will continue, as parents and their children strive to meet their own and others’ expectations in economic circumstances where a significant number are disadvantaged through lack of work and material resources; when changing family structures impose additional pressures; and when prevailing political ideologies put an emphasis on individual responsibilities and a residual approach to welfare.
52. There is no doubt that governments may quite legitimately seek to promote, encourage and in some circumstances enforce certain responsibilities, and the behaviours by which those responsibilities might be met. But how they do so should and will raise important public policy issues. When considering these issues policy makers and their advisors may find the New Zealand experience of considering a Code of Social and Family Responsibility instructive.

APPENDIX 1

APPENDIX 2

List of the 10 initiatives from code responses to be further developed by Government

In Social Welfare:

1. Referring people to budget advisors if they regularly need emergency income support.
2. In 1999 a review will consider lowering the age at which children can be prosecuted in Court. This review will also look at giving the Courts powers to make parents set curfews and attend parenting courses.
3. Research better ways of housing extended families.

4. Better child health by increasingly taking health services to disadvantaged children and their families and by working together with other social services agencies such as Welfare, Housing and Education.

5. Giving parents the skills they need to raise their children.
6. Providing teenagers with information on caregiving, budgeting and life skills in schools, including teaching them about responsibilities of parenthood.

7. Encouraging health education and welfare agencies to give families information on matters such as: antenatal care, child health checks, dental care and education.
8. More early intervention and home visiting programmes such as Family Start, Wraparound and Youth Aid.
9. Sharing good local ideas in health, education or social welfare so other communities can benefit.
10. Finding ways to make sure people can get information they need about shared parenting, and encouraging parents to put the children’s interests first if couples separate.